Non-Calvinists object to the idea that God pre-ordains every human decision and action on the grounds that it makes men to be some kind of mechanical robot or the victim of some kind of fatalism; in short, they say, man cannot exercise total and unhindered 'free-will' which they insist that man must be able to exercise if he is to be responsible for his actions. Instead of saying that God pre-ordains everything, He merely 'fore-knows' what man's actions and decisions will be. But does this alternative solve their objection? The answer is no. For how can a person whose choices are foreknown make choices different from those that are already known? If God knows from eternity past that John will at a particular time choose 'A' instead of 'B' then how could John possibly choose 'B'? If he is unable to choose 'B' then how can his choice be defined as free? For example, I just went to Bojangles and purchased a steak biscuit and a milk for breakfast. God knew before He created me that at a certain time this day I would in fact stop at a certain restaraunt and purchase these particular items. The fact that He foreknew this made it certain to happen. I say that I chose to do this of my own free-will-- but could I chosen to have done differently. Could I have ordered a coffee and sausage biscuit instead, when God knew that I would order a steak bisciut and milk? Could I have not stopped at all? What applies to something as insignificant as what I had for breakfast will certianly apply to greater things as well. The old proposed solution to the problems that we associate with reconciling God' foreordination and man's free-will does not solve anything at all. For if God knew beforehand that person 'A' would accept Christ and person 'B' would reject him, then the fact of the outcome of their choice was determined before they were ever born, and they are hence unable to choose otherwise.