Free Will Questions

Hi Hardseller;
Freewill is the choosing between right and wrong.Since God created everything in the universe then He created Satan and evil.God created choice.Your question should be, why did He create choice.With out choice we have no decisions to make. It just is. God has freewill he choose to create all of this, or was he made to by some yet unkown entity?God is not in subjection to any thing or person.His power is limitless,infinite.There is no other power in the universe that would or could govern Him.The only limits that God may have are the ones He imposes on Him self.Not by Nature. Our will is not limited by our nature.If this were so we wouldn't put any limits on our self.
There is no limit to what man will do to other men, so why would you think his will is limited at all.
Romanbear

 

How would this apply to Adam? Is Adam a lost person after the transgression? If so, is he then subject to the same nature described above?

 

Certainty of the Will Proved By God’s Sovereignty.

I have indicated, both when speaking of fatalism and of the impossibility of a scientia media concerning a contingent will, the argument for the certainty of the will contained in the fact of God’s sovereignty. If He is universal First Cause, then nothing is uncaused. Such is the argument; as simple as it is comprehensive. It cannot be taught that volitions are uncaused, unless you make all free agents a species of gods, independent of Jehovah’s control. In other words, if His providence extends to the acts of free agents, their volitions cannot be uncaused; for providence includes control, and control implies power. The argument from God’s sovereignty is, indeed, so conclusive, that the difficulty, with thinking minds, is not to admit it, but to avoid being led by it to an extreme. The difficulty rather is, to see how, in the presence of this universal, absolute sovereignty, man can retain a true spontaneity. I began by defining that, while the will of man is not self–determining, his soul is. I believe that a free, rational Person does properly originate effects; that he is a true fountain of spontaneity, determining his own powers, from within, to new effects. This is a most glorious part of that image of God, in which he is created. This is free agency! Now, how can this fact be reconciled with what we have seen of God as absolute First Cause?
The demonstration may be closed by the famous Reductio ad absurdum, which Edwards has borrowed from the scholastics. If the will is not determined to choice by motives, but determines itself, then the will must determine itself thereto by an act of choice; for this is the will’s only function. That is, the will must choose to choose. Now, this prior choice must be held by our opponents to be self–determined. Then it must be determined by the will’s act of choice—i. e., the will must choose to choose to choose. Thus we have a ridiculous and endless regressus.
I now return to consider the objections usually advanced against our doctrine. The most formidable is that which shall be first introduced; the supposed incompatibility of God’s sovereignty as universal First Cause, with man’s freedom.

Yet Man Under Providence Is Free.
The reconciliation may and does transcend our comprehension, and yet be neither unreasonable nor incredible. The point where the creature’s volition interpenetrates within the immense circle of the divine will, is beyond human view. When we remember that the wisdom, power and resources of God are infinite, it is not hard to see that there may be a way by which our spontaneity is directed, omnipotently, and yet without infringement of its reality. The sufficient proof is that we, finite creatures, can often efficaciously direct the free will of our fellows, without infringing it. Does any one say that still, in every such case, the agent, if free as to us, has power to do the opposite of what we induce him to do? True, he has physical power. But yet the causative efficacy of our means is certain; witness the fact that we were able certainly to predict our success. A perfect certainty, such as results from God’s infinitely wise and powerful providence over the creature’s will, is all that we mean by moral necessity. We assert no other kind of necessity over the free will. More mature reflection shows us, that so far are God’s sovereignty and providence from infringing man’s free agency, they are its necessary conditions. Consider: What would the power of choice be worth to one if there were no stability in the laws of nature, or no uniformity in its powers? No natural means of effectuating volitions would have any certainty,from such choice would be impotent, and motives would cease to have any reasonable weight. Could you intelligently elect to sow, if there were no ordinance of nature insuring seed time and harvest? But now, what shall give that stability to nature? A mechanical, physical necessity? That results in nothing but fatalism. The only other answer is: it must be the intelligent purpose of an almighty, personal God.

The leading objections echoed by Arminians against the certainty of the will, is, that if man is not free from all constraint, whether of motive or coaction, it is unjust in God to hold him subject to blame, or to command to those acts against which His will is certainly determined, or to punishments for failure. We reply, practically, that men are held blamable and punishable for acts to which their wills are certainly determined, both among men and before God, and all consciences approve. This is indisputable, in the case of those who are overmastered by a malignant emotion, as in Gen. 37:4, of devils and lost souls, and of those who have sinned away their day of grace. The Arminian rejoins (Watson, vol. 2, p. 438), such transgressors, notwithstanding their inability of will, are justly held responsible for all subsequent failures in duty, because they sinned away the contingency of their own wills, by their own personal, free act, after they became intelligent agents. But as man is born in this inability of will, through an arrangement with a federal head, to which he had no opportunity to dissent, it would be unjust in God to hold him responsible, unless He had restored the contingency of will to them lost in Adam, by the common sufficient grace bestowed through Christ. But the distinction is worthless: first, because, then, God would have been under an obligation in righteousness, to furnish a plan of redemption; but the Scriptures represent His act therein as purely gracious. Second. Because, then, all the guilt of the subsequent sins of those who had thrown away the contingency of their own wills, would have inherited in the acts alone by which they lost it. True, that act would have been an enormously guilty one, the man would have therein committed moral suicide. But it would also be true that the man was thereafter morally dead, and the dead cannot work. Third. The Arminian should, by parity of reason, conclude, that in any will certainly determined to holiness, the acts are not meritorious, unless that determination resulted from the being’s own voluntary self–culture, and formation of good dispositions and habits. Therefore God’s will, which has been from eternity certainly determined to good, does nothing meritorious.

But the more analytical answer to this class of objections is that the certainty of disobedience in the sinner’s will is no excuse for him, because it proceeds from a voluntary cause—i. e., moral disposition. As the volition is only the man willing, the motive is the man feeling; it is the man’s self. There is no lack of the requisite capacities, if the man would use those capacities aright. Now, a man cannot plead the existence of an obstacle as his excuse, which consists purely in his own spontaneous emission of opposition.

Rufus

 

Hardsheller,

If I understand this correctly, you're saying Adam was a lost sinner after he transgressed the command of God. If so, then I assume you believe Adam must have received the graces of election (i.e. regeneration) as well. Furthermore, he must also have had the faculty of "choice" reinstated as a result. Does this comply with you're statements above?

 

Hardsheller,

So you believe Adam did not possess "free will" before the fall. Rather, that his faculty of choice was both "able to sin or not able to sin". Is this what you mean? If so, are you saying Adam's faculty of choice was altered after the fall then changed back to what it was before the fall as result of regeneration?

 

The Freedom of the Will: Not Neutrality but One of Necessary Consequence

In our discussion of free will it should be noted first of all that man’s free will is not independent from God. Man is totally dependent upon God in regard 1) to his being, 2) to his activity, 3) to God’s prerogative to obligate him to His will and laws (so that His commands must be loved and what He has forbidden is to be hated), and 4) to the foreknowledge and decree of God, for He infallibly knows and has decreed that every matter and deed will have a certain outcome and none other. This foreknowledge cannot be thwarted; and this decree cannot be changed.

Secondly, the will does not function independently from the judgment faculty of the intellect. The will cannot possibly function apart from the intellect, neither can it do otherwise than follow the dictates of the intellect, for man is a rational being and therefore functions rationally. Otherwise the will would be able to reject that which is good as well as that which is perceived as being good, and find delight in sin as sin—all of which is irrational.

Thirdly, the will of man is not free from human peculiarities, for man functions according to his nature. A man who is perfectly holy in his nature will be a servant of righteousness, and the will shall respond likewise (Rom. 6:18). However, if man is nothing but sin in all his characteristics, he is a servant of sin (John 8:34). The will responds and functions in harmony with man’s sinful nature. To a holy nature belongs a holy will, and to a sinful nature a sinful will.

Even though the will is necessarily dependent upon the matters mentioned, this necessity does not eliminate the freedom of the will, nor is this necessity compulsory in nature, since the will responds spontaneously.

(1) The will is free from external compulsion. All the people on earth cannot force someone’s will or cause him to do something which he is not willing to do. In order to cause someone to do another’s will, however, the matter must be presented in such a manner that the person voluntarily chooses and wills, and thus functions according to his own will.

(2) The will of man is also free from natural instinct, by which animals, without being conscious of it, are motivated to function according to their purpose, for the will responds to the intellect and functions rationally.

Having considered in which respects the will of man is either free or not free, the question now presents itself: Wherein does the freedom of the will actually consist? Does it consist in neutrality so that it makes no difference whether or not we do something, or whether we do a certain thing or act to the contrary? Or is this freedom one of “necessary consequence,” man doing what he does by virtue of personal choice, personal desire, and thus spontaneously?

Rufus

 

Free Will: Is it Neutral?

Roman Catholics and Arminians respond by saying that this freedom consists in being neutral as far as either doing or not doing something, or doing a certain thing or acting to the contrary. Our response is that the will of man when considered in its essential nature, not being subject to any conditions, is neutral and unrestricted as far as doing a certain thing or the contrary thereof. It remains in this neutral position until the faculty judgment determines what ought or what not ought not to be done. Once such a determination has been made by judgmental application, the will can no longer remain neutral, can no longer but will to do this, and cannot refrain from willing to do the one thing rather than the contrary. Thus, the freedom of the will does not consist in neutrality; that is, the ability to will or not to will, or to will either one thing or the contrary, even if all requirements and restrictions were in place. Rather, the freedom of the will is one of necessary consequence.

This is first of all evident from the nature of God, the angels, the glorified in Christ, and also the devils. God cannot but be holy, righteous, and true. His will cannot but desire this and cannot act to the contrary. However, is not God’s will free to the superlative degree? The holy angels and glorified saints cannot will to either do good or evil. They can only will to be good and to do good. Is not their will entirely free? The Lord Jesus Christ could not will to be either obedient or disobedient to His Father. He could not do anything but be willing to obey His Father. Was not His will absolutely free? It is impossible for devils to will that which is good. They cannot but will to do that which is evil. In all these things there is an absolute freedom of will, but there is no neutrality as far as being willing or not willing to do something, or to will a certain thing or just its opposite. Thus, the freedom of the will does not consist in neutrality, but is one of necessary consequence.

Secondly, even though one can speculate about the will in its abstract nature, the will at no time functions outside the parameters of God’s providence, the faculty of judgment, and natural inclinations. Therefore, even when all requirements for its functioning are present, the will cannot arbitrarily function or not function, or do a certain thing or the contrary. Rather, it voluntarily embraces that to which it is limited by God and the faculty of judgment, and thus it does not remain neutral.

Thirdly, it is entirely absurd to define the freedom of the will as consisting in neutrality. If this were so, man could desire his damnation and to be eternally miserable, never to partake of supreme felicity; or he could choose the opposite: to acquire this felicity, the will being neutral towards both options. It would then be in vain to pray for conversion, for then even by divine operation the will could not be nudged from its neutral position, and man would always be able to will that he remain unconverted. Then God would have no power over the human will, but the will would remain independent, having as much control over itself as God does. This of course is absurdity itself.

Since the freedom of the will does not consist in neutrality, it is therefore clear that the freedom of the will is one of necessary consequence. This is not an irrational instinct as in animals, but by one’s own intelligent choice, willing, desiring, and embracing that which one by way of the faculty of judgment perceives as necessary or desirous at this particular place and time.

rufus

 

Hardsheller,

Which of the following do you prefer?

1. Adam has three states of "choice". One before the all (perhaps a higher degree of choice than any other human being has had. Alluding to your comment "It’s entirely possible that he possessed before the fall, the most free will mankind has ever possessed."). One after the fall. And one after regeneration.

2. Adam has two states of "choice". One before the fall. And one after the fall.

Or perhaps you have a third option that better describes your belief.

 

rufus,

Is this fatalism?

What is nature then? Can the nature of something or someone change and still remain the exact something or someone? Can a creature have a “holy nature” and then a “sinful nature” and still remain the same creature?

Concerning your second post titled "Free Will: Is it Neutral?"

Was Lucifer created inherently evil? Not according to Ez. 28. Did Lucifer make a choice?

 

Hardsheller,

With my post of February 11, 2003 07:24 PM in mind, I ask the same question I have posed to rufus;

What is nature? Can the nature of something or someone change (or be altered) and still remain the exact something or someone? For example, using option two from my previous post and assuming "choice" is an attribute of Adam's nature, is Adam one kind of human being before the fall and then another kind of human being after the fall? Also, after regeneration, is he changed back to the former state and thus the same human being he was created as?

As I understand, nature is the inherent or intrinsic characteristics of something or someone. These characteristics make the something or someone what it is. Thus if those characteristics are alterable they are either 1) not of the nature or 2) the something or someone under consideration is not what it was before (IMO, an impossibility and rather a result of mistaken identity).

For example, God's nature is unchangeable. Otherwise He is not God. IMO, this is the perfect definition of the term "nature". Thus the "nature" of something or someone is unchangeable. The question is, do the creatures of God's creation posses the same attribute of nature as He does? That is, that their nature, by virtue of nature itself, is unchangeable?

This all boils down to one thing. What do we mean by the terms "holy nature" or "sinful nature"? Are we really talking about the intrinsic values of a human being?

 

Then you obviously have detailed descriptions of both before and after conditions of Adam. You must know exactly what attributes Adam had before the fall and what he was left with after the fall. If you do not have such details, you have nothing upon which to base your belief.

It is pure spectulation to think that Adam's humanity was changed when he sinned. That which did change is "the knowledge of good and evil" resulting from the consumption of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil.

Created man remained created man with the image of God intact, but the state of innocence no longer existed, because Adam now possessed knowledge that there is good and evil.

 

And this relates to us how? Are you the same as an archangel or the devil?

 

IMO "Number 2" is the best description for Pronounism, but that's a whole 'nother topic.

 

npetreley,

So I guess you're suggesting rufus' comments about the will of angels is irrelevant to our understanding of "choice". But more importantly, I suppose Ez. 28 is irrelevant and so Lucifer's choices aren't important. Perhaps Ez. 28 doesn't relate to us and therefore we can ignore it.

 

Or perhaps Ez 28 is there for some reason other than to teach free will.