The Situation at the US Embassy in Iraq

I look for the Iranian diaper-heads to try to do some cowardly act such as blowing up a daycare center, etc. I don't see them coming out and openly fighting. they don't have such a hot record at warfare since the Greex whupped them in BC times.

But they'll survive to be part of the coalition against Israel in the "Gog-Magog war".

 

Well, sneer all you like but I stand with the US government on this issue.

 

Albania, sure. But you can't just throw out "the Balkans" and then point to Albania. The Balkans have both a current and long history of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and war.

 

Tom, none of us are. I know I am not.

 

And China is in there doing it now. And the UAE. And India.

 

Trump upset the Democrats, the Russians, the Chinese, and the Iranians, the Toronto commies, and some Europeans. Sounds like he did the right thing. Iran attacked six ships in the Persian Gulf, Iran fired missiles into the Saudi Oil Fields, Iran attacked the US Embassy (just to prove that they are still barbarians) and Trump fired a drone at their big-shot general and his right-hand man. Good Job, Mr. President!

 

We have been to almost every Balkan country and the above description fits most of them. Of course there were the events you described. Where is there genocide going on now?

The majority of Muslims are somewhat better than their wretched religion, not bent on world domination nor threatening to "Slay the infidels wherever we find them". That radical attitude is mostly found in regions where outside forces have brought them to that way of thinking.

 

Radicalism in Islam is baked into their religion. Mohammed started it out that way. They have always sought out world domination. The Crusades, right or wrong, were in response to their aggression. Those who are in it but not radicalized are outliers not the norm.

 

Muslims play the long game--they have warred against civilization for 1400 years with more to come. There are jihadi terror attacks everyday worldwide.

 

It's a major crossroads, an area fought over centuries before America became a world power. Can't really fault Europe for having an interest since multiple invasions have been launched through there.

 

So, moving forward, what should the United States do regarding Iran? Well, a lot of that depends on Iran. If Iran keeps its reaction to the Solemani killing to rallies and threatening (without action), the immediate danger will subside. If Iran attacks United States interests, either directly or through one of its shell terrorist organizations, it will be hit hard. Of course, long term Iran remains a threat to the nations around it. Iran will now have to calculate reprisals into its military and terrorist strategy.

 

Iran Lacks Good Options
by Jonathan Spyer
The Jerusalem Post
January 4, 2020

"First, it is worth recalling the sequence of events. The killing on Thursday of IRGC Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani outside Baghdad International Airport by a US MQ9 Reaper Drone firing a Hellfire missile, was the latest escalation in a process that began with the killing of an American contractor by the Iran-supported Kataib Hezbollah militia on December 27. The death of this US citizen led to US action against five facilities of Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq. This, in turn, led to the militia and other pro-Iran elements storming into Baghdad's Green Zone and beginning a violent demonstration outside the US Embassy. This latter protest raised the specter of the Iran embassy siege of 1979.

The US killing of Soleimani (as well as Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, commander of Kataib Hezbollah and a number of other IRGC officials) was the latest move in this process of escalation.

What appears to have caused this escalation was the departure by the Iranians from a tacit ground rule hitherto maintained. According to this rule, undeclared but noted by a number of analysts including this author, the Iranian regime was apparently to be permitted by Washington to strike at US allies with impunity, and could even hit at US hardware, but it would be best advised not to harm US citizens.

On December 27, Iran failed to abide by this rule. In so doing, it set in motion the series of events culminating in the death of Soleimani, al-Muhandis and the others.

The killing of Soleimani obligates Iran to respond and in so doing places the regime before a dilemma. Iran is exponentially weaker than the United States on the conventional military level. Its best options lie in asymmetrical warfare. In this regard, the long toil of the late Soleimani and his colleagues provides Iran with a wide suite of options.

Most obviously, the US maintains around 5,000 military personnel in Iraq and just under 1,000 in Syria. Iran has missiles and rockets deployed, and tens of thousands of available personnel in both countries. It has struck in the past. The assassination of Soleimani has not removed this capability. Logistically and operationally, a similar strike to the one that commenced the current round of escalation would be possible to organize.

Iran could also begin a broad popular and political campaign intended to culminate in a demand by the government of Iraq for the withdrawal of US forces. Badr Organization commander Hadi al-Ameri, in a statement following the US operation, appeared to hint at this course, calling on members of parliament and all 'national forces' to unite in order to expel 'foreign forces' from Iraq.

Further afield, the events of the summer showed that Tehran has the capability of hitting at US allied targets in the Gulf waterways, the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el Mandeb and on the soil of Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

The IRGC, aided by its Lebanese Hezbollah proxy, also possesses networks in Europe, North and South America, and South and East Asia, as evidenced by a list of previous attacks and thwarted planned operations.

So the physical possibility of response, or at least attempted response, is not at issue. But Iran's dilemma is the following: the current escalation that culminated in the death of Soleimani was the direct result of Iran's departure from a set of tacit rules in place until then. If the Iranian response appears to be a return to a tacit observance of these rules, then even it is successful it will still project an aura of weakness.

The destruction of US hardware, a strike on allies, even a strike by a proxy on a US facility or personnel, will not be sufficient to "even the score."

But if Iran chooses to adopt the only course of action which would be seen by all as proportionate to the loss of Soleimani – namely the killing by the IRGC or some other Iranian agency of one or a number of US citizens – then the evidence of recent days suggests that the US may well be willing to escalate to a level of confrontation at which the Iranians cannot compete.

This dilemma is compounded by an accompanying fact. While lacking a clear and coherent regional strategy, US President Donald Trump's administration has made clear in word and deed over the last two years that it has no interest in major re-engagement in the Middle East, or in new conflicts in that arena of "bloodstained sand," as Trump has referred to the region. Trump's statements following the killing of Soleimani confirm this impression.

The events of recent days show that the one action which can over-ride this aversion is the targeting of US citizens or personnel. That is, Iran has the incentive of potentially getting to keep much of what it gained in recent years in the Middle East, if it swallows the humiliation of Soleimani's loss.

But then its deterrent power and ability to project strength will be perhaps irrevocably damaged. Taking the only path which can adequately avenge that loss, meanwhile, means potentially losing everything in a direct confrontation with the US. It is now Iran's move. The US escalation has placed Iran in a situation in which there are no easy options. The decision now to be taken by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei will determine the direction of the Middle East in the next period."​