Here a noted author makes a statement in support of the Middle Knowledge Theory. The words concerning creatures ‘acting freely’ simply roll off the end of his pen, but is the freedom he speaks of true freedom or masked necessity? It matters not what issue one is addressing involving freedom, there is a principle involved that cannot be overlooked. If there is only one possible consequent for a given antecedent, no freedom can be predicated. If there are two or more possible consequents for a given antecedent, freedom is said to exist. In the authors mind, as I understand him, he tries to rid the Calvinist model of necessity, which he logically sees as forcing the conclusion that God is the author of all evil as well as good. He sees the avoidance of making God the author of evil possible by God planning a world of possible choices that are ‘achieved by creatures acting freely.’ My question to the author, and any such as FA that hold his thoughts in such high esteem, is to tell me how freedom can be achieved when there is only one possible world finally created for man to act out, one possible consequent for a given antecedent? What is the significant difference between this view and the necessitated foreknowledge view of Calvinism, if there is but one possible world created, or one possible intent foreknown? It still eliminates freedom for God is the cause, not man, of the possible world that is to become reality. How can such a view hide behind a sophistic cloak of creatures acting with ‘freedom’ while laying the foundation of necessity? This appears to be the same old falsehood that one is ‘free to do as one wills,’ just as Calvinism has always stated. The seeming argument between MK and the necessitated foreknowledge of God is like a couple of crows on a fence arguing about who is the blackest. They both make God out to be ‘the cause’ of the intents and actions of men and by doing so are guilty of building the case of God being the author of all evil. IMO, the real difference between foreknowledge necessitating intents and MK is that the simple Calvinist admits to the error he knows full well lies within his philosophical approach to God’s foreknowledge, while those holding to middle knowledge try and hoodwink themselves into believing that they hold to freedom of the will when in reality they believe no such thing. Whoever is shown to be the actual cause of the intent is the only one exercising freedom. If God is the cause, as MK evidently admits, (as I understand them) freedom within man is a mere chimera. Man must be the cause of his intents if man is said to be free or to exercise freedom. Man must be able to choose something other than what he does, under the very same set of circumstances, without force or coercion even from God via the particular creation of a specific world, if true freedom exists for man and man is to be seen as a proper recipient of praise or blame. Only as man is seen as the creator of his moral intents is necessity eliminated from making God the author of all evil. What are your thoughts? Are there any more on the list that see problems with the MK view point other than myself?