4 Views on God's Foreknowledge - Omniscience

Phil 2 --

Who being found in the FORM of God humbled himself taking on the FORM of a servant.

Both are stated in equal force. If you can argue that PRIOR to emptying Himself He was not truly God THEN AND ONLY THEN can you argue that AFTER emptying Himself He was not fully man.

I would not do it - but I suppose you can give it a shot.

In any case the list is obvious - and true.

God can not be tempted - Scripture says Christ was tempted
God does not get hungry - scripture says Christ was hungry
God does not get thirsty - Scrpture says Christ was thirsty
God is all powerful - Scripture says Christ fell under the weight of the cross
God does not get tired - Christ was exhausted and slept sometimes every day!

You can not go to the word of God where He states that the Son EMPTIED HIMSELF (Phil 2) being found in the form of a man to the point that HE HIMSELF says "I can of my own self do NOTHING" and there INSERT the invincible God qualities for him - and still have scripture hold without contradiction.

--

Jesus did NOT dwell in unnapproachable light while on earth - God does.

Jesus did NOT say to Peter (as He did to Moses) you can not look upon me and Live.

Jesus was obviously NOT coming in Glory at His first coming.

This obvious point hardly bears repeating.

In Christ,

Bob

 

HP: Here we are back to that freedom/necessitated dilemma. You are representing a Sovereign,Free, and Loving God as one bound by necessity. You eliminate all virtue with such a characterization, for virtue can only exist where freedom exists, and freedom cannot exist in an environment of necessity.

A rock falling off a cliff is exhibiting as much freedom as you give God when you bind and shackle Him to necessity, telling me that there is no other possible intent possible other than the one 'He chooses.' There is no choice in the scenerio you are painting of God.


We know He ALWAYS choose the good, the righteous, the holy, but all these only exist when they lie fully within the realm of freedom to do something other than what is chosen under the very same set of circumstances. Vitue denotes freedom, and freedom denotes choice, and choice denoted the distinct possibility of contrary intents.


If you are handed one apple, you cannot choose 'which one' to reject or accept. You can only accept or reject the one apple. If there is only one possible consequent for a given antecedent, no choice or freedom can be predicated of any intent or subsequent action.


Can you conceive of a virtuous rock, or a righteous stone? Why not? What is it about a rock that denies that freedom can be predicated of any action it might be associated with?

 

Some interesting developments. Yes, those who believe that libertarian free will adds somehow to the dignity or virtue of a deity or creature will defend it well and consistently by claiming that Jesus could have sinned. Hopefully, they will also be consistent and claim that libertarian free will holds in heaven as on earth, so God has libertarian free will too. I mean if God can be morally righteous without ever having libertarian free will, then how is it true that libertarian free will is necessary for morality?

Remember one can only be morally praised if she is able to do otherwise. Thus, having any moral bent as an essential part of one's character (as many Christians hold for God) is making God as virtuous as a stone falling. Now having randomness guide one's decisions and not one's character...that's virtue...that's dignity-even for God.

[I know some will balk at my use of randomness. From what I can tell that's the best word used to describe the basis of one's decisions in libertarian free will. I don't mean anything negative by it, and if someone here prefers a better word then I'm fine with that if they let me know what that word is. I've always found it odd that the idea of sanctification with libetarian free will allows for previous decisions to somehow affect the decision at hand, but doesn't that go against the fundamental notion of libertarian free will-nothing causally affects the decision at hand. I know they say all sorts of things don't causally affect decisions, but then they start sounding like compatibilists when they talk like that. Oh well back to the real reason for my post.]

He does not have necessary moral goodness, which is incoherent according to them. Instead, he everlastingly chooses to do good, but He could have chosen to do evil. Somehow they get to consistency and stability (avoiding extreme medieval voluntarism) in God's character by saying that God just chooses once. Yandell roots this in God's omniscience and everlastingness, and others have as well perhaps changing everlastingness to eternality. Would an omniscient God choose evil?

One may be inclined to say no, but the libertarian free will holder must avoid any such concession because that smacks of necessity and sneaks in essential moral goodness as part of God's nature via His omniscience. There must be no real reason why He chose good-He has to have been able to do otherwise if it was a free and moral decision. In fact the euthyphro question now comes up for the libertarian theologian. Since she cannot ground good and evil in God's essence, then where do these notions come from? God is choosing between good and evil before the foundation of the world so they must already exist somehow for Him to choose between them and be a moral agent in the libertarian sense.

Yandell, being the platonist that he is, simply grounds the laws of logic and ethics in necessarily existing abstract forms. He must then conclude that since these abstract forms that are the grounding of the laws of logic and ethics exist necessarily that God does not exist necessarily. The only possible world without His existence isn't a very interesting one since the abstract forms can't do anything, but it is a possible world. I do thank Yandell for being consistent with his firm belief in libertarian free will and fleshing out philosophically how adherence to libertarian free will applies to other realms of theology.

Many here on the board may have never heard these things before, but it is at least a complete theological system from a Christian analytic philosopher who firmly believes that libertarian free will is necessary for morality.

Hopefully, I haven't offended some with such extreme straw men and hurtful words .

BJ

PS-Yandell also argues that after the Incarnation the Second Person of the Trinity has to choose again to be morally good, so He can truly be tempted as Scripture says. This makes no sense to me, and I can't quite remember why the divine nature of Christ gets to do this in his system. However, this goes more into anthropology and Christology so it's tangential to this post.

 

In regards to Brandon's post:

First, Freewill adds no dignity or virtue, it simply is the means by which virtue takes on the meaning of something praiseworthy.

There is a point that needs clarification. This distinction between a compatibilistic freewill and a libertarian freewill is a chimera. Freewill is simply freewill. The notion of compatibilistic freewill is an attempt of those holding to necessity to bridge the terminology gap with the use of the word ‘freewill’ so as to evidently sound more palatable to the ear than simply referring to themselves as they really are, i.e., holding to sheer necessity. Make no mistake about it. Compatibilistic freewill is no freewill at all. I have tried in the past to make this clear, and I believe it will become clearer as we go along.

It is a mistake to take that which we know pertaining to our state as finite moral beings, and then to extrapolate that to apply in the same manner to the moral state of God. If that was possible it would assume that we could, with our finite understanding, plum the depths of God’s Infinite nature. That simply is impossible.

Brandon, as well as all those holding to the dogma of necessity, evidently believes that if there is an intent, something must necessitate that intent outside of ones own will. They seem to have no conception of man as the creator of their intents, and man as a first cause of those intents.

I take clear exception to Brandon’s use of the word randomness in relationship to ones choices. That in no way describes in the least the moral intents of God or man. Moral intents are not random choices, but are intents of the will in either a specific selfish or benevolent manner. If they were simply random choices, no morality could be predicated of them. The idea of our moral intents as being the mere product of randomness, is sheer folly, not having a scintilla of truth in such a depiction. (I am not offended, just drawing attention to the truth of the matter )

Utilizing Brandon’s approach in questioning freewill, let me ask him in the same manner. If our intents are necessitated as moral beings, and something lies antecedent to our choices, sustaining to the will the relationship of a cause, then hopefully he would be consistent and claim that necessity holds in heaven as well as it does here on earth. Just as you seem to indicate that something must lie antecedent to our willing, sustaining to the will the relationship of a cause for our choices, something must indeed lie antecedent to God’s choices that necessitates Him choosing as He does. What might that be?

I say that if something indeed lies antecedent to our will and therefore our choices, the will is not free, and all blame or praise for that choice lies directly with that cause, and not our own wills. Morality in such a case cannot be predicated of any such choice.

HP: So do you think God has necessitated moral goodness? What is the cause of this necessitated moral goodness?

I see 'necessitated goodness' as an oxymoron.

 

HP: Was He less than omniscient as a man at the point and time He chose not to know something? Can Omniscience know less than all?

 

Early in your post we can't speculate about God's moral character, but by the end of your post you seem to question whether or not He is necessarily morally good? So which is it: agnosticism on God's moral character or skepticism on having morality as part of His essence?

Plus, why is it impossible to extrapolate what one holds concerning free will to God? You hold that for a decision to be moral than it must be free (in your "clarified" definition of freedom equating libertarian free will). You confirm that it is the means by which virtue takes on the meaning of something praiseworthy. Scripture presents God as praiseworthy so does He use a different system to obtain it or is virtue for Him not worthy of praise (the virtue of a stone falling so to speak)? Would it not be a contradiction to identify God as a moral agent, but then say that libertarian free will does not apply to Him? If He is an exception, then it is indeed possible for a decision to be moral and not fit the terms of libertarian freedom. This begs the question as to what other exceptions would apply to this universal claim that morality requires libertarian freedom.

The ineffability excuse can be used for everything concerning God if you want it to. However, regarding God's goodness revelation clearly states that He is righteous, and I believe it claims this of God from eternity. Thus, we know He has always been morally good. Would it not be reasonable to at least ask the question how God is morally good (especially if one holds a system that libertarian freedom is required for moral goodness)?

I cannot concede that compatibilistic free will is a chimera. Why don't we just define away all positions we disagree with by saying that they don't exist since we disagree with them?

Disguising this circular reasoning as a "clarification" is silly. "I have a clarification for Arminians, they really don't believe in sovereignty because sovereignty by definition implies Calvinism. Thus, this notion of God's sovereignty in Arminianism is a chimera. Arminians like their system to be palatable to the ears so they even try to claim that their view gives God more sovereignty (meaning that He has less control, etc.). Just a point of clarification of course. I've pointed this out before, and I'm sure it will become clearer when people read my most excellent thoughts on this thread" (All sarcasm in quotes above...this is silliness).

That's fine that you object to randomness being in play, but how many "causal" factors come into play in a moral decision for it to not be free in a libertarian sense? What are the causes of one's intents of the will, my question still applies because this regression of intents and wills never stops short of randomness or else some scary antecedent necessitating a choice will finally be to blame. So what do we replace randomness with? Intents? Okay what is the cause of the intents? You see the regression starting, you end up with either randomness or nasty causality.

I'll gladly answer your question that God acts according to His desires without constraint. You may call this necessity (implying that God's hands are tied on His decisions so to speak, but that leads to a different discussion on the possibility of God somehow "choosing" His own nature which I find to be a ridiculous notion), but I don't think it limits God one bit that He acts according to His essence, which includes necessary moral goodness. The cause of it? No different than the "cause" of God Himself or any other essential attribute that He has. For more on the philosophical issues involved I encourage you to read Jay Richards's "The Untamed God" for what I can tell so far is the best treatment of the subject.

Well my time and thoughts must be devoted elsewhere because I'm well into the quarter up here so I will refrain from wasting anymore time on this matter.

I'm sure the poster of the OP will be thankful for that .

 

HP: I hope we can continue our discussions. What better time than well into the first quarter?


I will address just the first paragraph this morning, and I will address the last this evening the Lord willing.

If you will recall your own post, it was you, not I, that made the comment, evidently indicating that YOU felt that those holding to freewill, in the following manner. I never speculated in the least concerning God’s moral character. He is Infinite Love, Goodness, and Infinitely Just. I again was just referring to your statement. This is what you had posted.

HP: Again that was your quote out of the blue, and not a response to anything I had said. That is why I even brought up the point. My comment was as follows, “It is a mistake to take that which we know pertaining to our state as finite moral beings, and then to extrapolate that to apply it ”IN THE SAME MANNER’ to the moral state of God. If that was possible it would assume that we could, with our finite understanding, plum the depths of God’s Infinite nature. That simply is impossible.”

What I was trying to get across was that with a God that is Infinite and we are but finite, and there is a point regardless if you feel that He is best described by an oxymoron such as ‘necessitated goodness,’ or whether you feel that indeed he is Good but that is not necessitated but due to His freewill choices, ones arguments run into difficulty due to God never having a first choice or a first act. When we think of morality and character, we see it DEVELOPED in man. With God He has always existed.

That still in no way proves necessitated goodness, but rather just places His Character outside of the realm of our abilities to understand. One thing I refuse to do is to speak of the nature of a Loving God in terms that that are absurd in light of any understanding of love, like one does by using the term ‘necessitated.’ Love is at its core a choice of the will. Nothing in God’s nature deprives the word love from that understanding, it just makes His love Infinite and beyond our abilities to comprehend or formulate finite arguments concerning it without running into logical difficulties. One thing is for certain, love cannot be necessitated in God or in man. Love is not a special way of feeling nor is it a fixed or static state. Love is and must be, a choice of the will, whether or not in God or in man.

 

Okay, okay, but I've got plenty of studying to do, but has been a good break from critiquing non-reductive physicalist theological anthropologies.

I know you were responding to my quote. My point was you hid behind ineffability sometimes but throw it out at other times. What's the principle behind this? What is the criterion for something falling under ineffability? Again in this post you waffle between not being able to predicate things of God and then making claims about God. So which is it? We can say something about God regarding love having to be a choice of the will, but if I were to claim that freedom for God has to be libertarian freedom your response is we can't really say? This is inconsistent. Either use the ineffability excuse and refrain from saying things like your last sentence in your last post or address my questions. You can't have it both ways.

Now to necessitated goodness....I will mince words I say that He has the essential attribute of moral goodness. I do believe that God's concrete existence is the basis for why we can say He has any attributes (Richards helps out here, and I'm surely not making things as clear as he would). Perhaps It'd be better if I left the necessary talk of the table when talking of essential attributes, it doesn't really help anything and I'm by no means a rationalist or perfect being theologian. My reasoning is this: all of God's essential attributes exist in every possible world. I believe one of God's essential attributes is moral goodness. The necessity talk just muddles things so I'll refrain from using it.

You believe God is infinite love, goodness, and justice but you imply in your posts that there is one or more than one possible world where this would not be true of God, where God would not be infinite love, goodness, and justice because love is a choice God must make and there are no essential moral attributes of agents without actions establishing such attributes. I find such thinking absurd as much as you find the belief that God has the essential attribute of moral goodness absurd. You seem to contrast the morality that develops in man with the lack of such development in God. How is that possible if He does not have moral goodness as an essential attribute? You're mistaken, those like you have a problem addressing God never having a first choice or act to develop morality. I don't. He has an essence that includes moral goodness so His actions will never sway from that from the first to the last. Is essential moral goodness for God that absurd then?

You may not have speculated about God's character earlier but in this last post you present Him as Infinite love, goodness and justice so my point sticks. How, in your view, is He infinitely love, goodness, and justice. Especially since, given your last sentence, for Him to be infinitely love He must choose to be so. Thus, my point about the grounding of good and evil (the euthryphro question) still stands. If God chooses to love, then that implies that there are pre-existing options for Him to choose from. It also implies that He could have chosen hate and evil. What is the grounding of these options of good and evil? Do you agree that they are necessarily existing abstract forms like Yandell, or do you ground them in something else? Or is it time to invoke infinity and ineffability and once again dodge the issue? If it's so absurd to talk of love without grounding it in a choice, then methinks you should at least attempt to explain your metaphysics here. You should also address how your view avoids voluntarism (in the medieval sense). God chooses to love once in this world, does that hold for future choices? Can He change His mind and freely choose evil later in the world? If not, why not? I presented Yandell's answers, but you have offered none.

I think it's preferable to ground good and evil in God's own essence and avoid such issues. However, the cost for the libertarian free will person is admitting that libertarian free will and love can be grounded in one's essence rather than actions. Compatibilists are fine with that, what say you?

Will you suck me in to another response on this thread? I don't know, but it's annoying that you try at the same time to say that libertarian free will is necessary for praiseworthiness and that love has to be chosen, but then say that those are not exceptions for God but they kind of are, well we can't really speak for God. This special pleading is getting old. Can you at least admit it's possible (even if unlikely in your opinion) for an agent to be morally praiseworthy and free and loving without the framework of libertarian free will instead of hiding behind God's ineffability everytime the issue comes up regarding whether or not He is an exception to your claim? I'm not saying you have to agree with me, but at least admit the universal presuppostions regarding love and freedom are problematic when discussing God instead of conveniently talking of His ineffability when it comes up as if that answers every problem.

BJ

 

HP: I appreciate your willingness to continue our discussions. I will try my best to focus and be as brief and direct as I can. Forgive me, but it has proven to be of little use to start with the nature of God without some groundwork laid. I will return to all your questions surrounding that issue in due time. I am not avoiding the issue in the least. I just do not desire to write around each other in every post.

I would like to back up and focus on definitions of the words we use if I may. We are addressing freedom of the will and necessity. Both freedom and necessity have meanings that are at antipodes with each other. I believe it is a first truth of reason that in order to do anything blameworthy or praiseworthy, one must have a choice. This choice does not consist in doing as one wills, but a choice to form the very intent that necessitates the subsequent action. I believe that the will sustains to the doing the relationship of a cause, and can be stated in the following manner. One can ONLY do as one wills. Freedom again must lay antecedent to the doing, in the formation of the intent within the will. The formation of the intent is the heart of morality.

If the will is said to be free, nothing can sustain to its formation of intent the relationship of a cause. If something sustains to the will the relationship of a cause, the will is NOT free, but under bondage, and any blame or praise can only be directed to the outside ‘cause’ applying force or coercion upon the will.

In summary, I would simply say that freedom of the will can only exist where nothing lays antecedent to the formation of the intents that would sustain to the will the relationship of a cause. On the other hand, ‘necessity’ applies if in fact something does sustain to the will the relationship of a cause. If necessity applies, no freedom exists. It is folly to speak of freedom of the will if in fact force or coercion determines the outcome of the wills formation of its intents. It is absurd to consider any punishment or rewards for an intent of the will when in fact no choice has been possible in the formation of the intents due to an outside force or coercion upon the will.

Agree or disagree?

 

HP: Brandon, you posted this on the thread concerning the origin of evil. What is there to ‘check out?’ I did not quote from any books that are hard to find or would cost you time, and I did not utilize a bunch of difficult theological terms, I simply consulted your conscience and reasoning powers which I feel are well above the average. What is there to ‘check out?’ Just follow the logic and reason. If it is in error, point it out, and express to me the truth of the matter as you see it. Don’t make this more difficult than it is. Is attempting to simply define ones terms no essential for any meaningful discussion?

 

Are you calling predetermine and predestine the same?

I would think that predetermine is closer on the semantic range to foreknowledge . . . unless maybe you are implying discriminatory type predetermine - almost like prejudice?

 

HP: Glad to se you are back at least some. I am going to have to be out of pocket a lot as well.

In relationship to your comment, I would say that God desires rocks to lay still in the same way MK understands God to desire man to make good choices…….predetermination.

 

HP: FA, I have stated this before but it obviously bears repeating. Whatever determines the intent, is the cause and subsequent responsible agent for that intent. If God, regardless of how He does it or from how many possible worlds He has determined is possible for Him to pick from, in the MK model, the bottom line has not changed one iota from the Calvinitic model of determinism. God alone is still the lone cause of the final intent, and as such is the Cause and the ONLY responsible agent of that cause.

Just because the creature ‘does’ as he was programmed to do, (which you call synonymous with whatever possible world God chose for him to act in accordance to,) the will can still 'only do' as he was predestined to do which is nothing other than pure unadulterated necessity. Under such a scheme, you have not escaped the logical deduction that, if it is as MK presents it is, God is indeed the author of all sin.


There is not the least shred of moral freedom in the MK model for man if it is as you and Brandon have presented it thus far. It represents God as exhibiting freedom, but not man. Man can still only do as God foreordains. That, my friend, is the heart and sole of Calvinistic determination. To suggest that MK represents freedom of the will is a mere sophism as I understand it.

I am still trying to determine if in fact I have missed or overlooked anything. If you feel I have, fire away.

 

Agreed. God both foreknows not only the actions of men - He also foreknows the results of His own actions and chooses accordingly.

So He knew that when He made Lucifer AND free will - the result -- Lucifer would one day be Satan.

If God MADE Lucifer be Satan - if Free Will was not isolating God fully from the RESULTS - then God is to blame for CAUSING Satan.

But also notice - when Lucifer falls - God does not instantly destroy him. So SATAN is in that sense only around because God has not come to the point where His perfect foreknowledge has seen the perfect time to destroy Satan. PERFECT TIMING is all about a free will system where emperical data and compelling argument (See Job 1 and 2) guarantee right conclusions in non-God beings.

In Christ,

Bob