Crucified in Christ
New Member
I apologize if I sounded as though I was ordering readers around...I would not dream of doing so. Still, for the record, I am not sure who this "we" is that seems to have forgotten the lessons of history. To pretend that the history learned in Iraq automatically transfers to a strategy in Afghanistan is faulty thinking. The disaster of the first few years in Iraq is proof of this very principle, as many in the Pentagon believed the "small foot-print" theory of occupation/Counter-insurgency that had become the favored positions of the militicians. Even Gen. Petraeus assured Congress that you could not simply port over the Iraq strategy; certain principles, however, could be applied.
Having stated that, you agree with me that certain factors are out of our hands. Primarily, you mention the Pakistani public's growing weariness in relation to the militants. That is a factor that is not in our hands. The surge in Iraq needed this dynamic to be successful...we did not create it.
Next, to say that the level of Pakistani public unhappiness is equivalent to what happened in Iraq is an over-statement at the very least. Tribal and civic leaders were coming to the U.S. military, turning against AQ in Iraq and other insurgency groups. Even the most optimistic analysts are not purporting this to be happening in Waziristan. I whole-heartedly support the operation in Afghanistan, but let's not exaggerate what is happening. In Iraq, civilian terrorism casualties were unacceptable to everyone (including some insurgents). The Pakistani violence has not been directed toward the public in the same way. In Iraq, the majority of the terrorists were seen as outsiders, this is much less so in Pakistan. The government of Iraq was committed to getting rid of the terrorists in country; we have certainly seen no such commitment on the part of the Pakistani government (just look at the power of the ISS to this day and their loyalty is well-known).
Finally, I alluded to changing winds in my last post; this situation is one of the factors that I was referring to. Still, to imply that Pakistan has suddenly changed its tune and is now going to go after the T/AQ power-structure in Waziristan is way too optimistic and premature. The media played up the Swat valley assault like it was a new day in the region. The Taliban simply moved too close for comfort...a response was expected. Pakistan responded more harshly than it has in the past. As you pointed out, this was possible because of public support for such an operation. As for the promised upcoming campaign into Waziristan, we will see what becomes of it. We have seen government campaigns there every year, with predictable results. The question is whether or not the Government wants to prosecute a real campaign, especially not knowing the Pakistani public's stomach for a bloody operation in a part of the country the average Pakistani care little about. If they turn out to be committed, things could rapidly change...I certainly hope that they are. Still, what reports are you hearing of AQ beginning to be concerned about these developments? If you can find one, please post it. There is no real fear that much is changing.
Notice, we didn't even discuss the problems in Afghanistan...there are a large plate of them there as well. If it is all as simple as you say, I will be very relieved...this matters to me very much. Still, I find it interesting that I know of no expert on the region that sees things this as this "ripe for the picking".