Pressure of Command

Recently Salty posted a thread about films exploring the pressures of military command.

That started me thinking about two types of commanders. Those who used abrasive behavior to encourage compliance, and those who did not. Consider the style of Patton, or MacArthur, versus Eisenhower or Nimitz.

Ben Franklin avoided direct conflict, and was patient enough to allow prayerful consideration of alternate views.

One of the key command decisions of Chester Nimitz was to keep the intelligence officer who had failed to effectively warn of an imminent attack on Pear Harbor. Others would have sacked the whole Command Team. But Chester dd the opposite, he gave the "broken reed" another chance to tell Nimitz what the Empire of the Sun was planning to do.

And as they say, the rest (our victory at Midway) is history.

 

At the start of WWII, Japan had more Aircraft Carriers, and more experienced pilots. After Midway, two very different Command Decisions were made.

Midway resulted in a significant loss of experienced Japanese carrier pilots, but the remaining core of experienced pilots were left on the carriers to fly more missions.

OTOH, Nimitz directed that about 75 pilots from our Midway carriers be sent stateside for R&R and then as flight school instructors.

Both military commands had suffered large losses in their inventory of effective pilots, but Japan still held the edge. However, sometime in the next 6-9 months, after June 1942, the "upward swing of American pilots crossed the declining line of Japanese pilots." Nimitz understood that as American airplane production raced ahead, we needed to have good pilots for our great new planes.

Here then is another example of patient consideration of alternate views, one allowing urgency to override importance, and the other to manage the present while building for the future.

Footnote: The quotation is a paraphrase from "Nimitz at War".

 

Prior to June 19, 1944, a command issue rankled Nimitz's command structure. As the attack fleet under Nimitz and delegated to Admiral Spruance approached the Marianas Islands, the various Commanders, including the Carrier task force commander, Mitscher learned of the approaching Japanese naval fleet, including their carriers. Mitscher needed to depart his supporting cover position near the islands because he needed to close the distance between his carriers and those of the Japanese. This is because the Japanese planes had a greater range, about 300 miles, and his had only about 200 miles.

However, the landing needed air support so Spruance tethered Mitscher to within about 180 miles of the islands. Thus while managing the present urgency, protecting the landing, including the vital LST's off-loading the heavy equipment such as fully loaded support trucks, food and ammo, Mitscher was also able to send his deadly new planes (Hellcats) and his better trained pilots to interdict the Japanese.

And the rest, as they say is history, our devastating victory known as the Marianas Turkey Shoot.

The command pressure issue presented in this post is based on insights from "Nimitz at War."